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SUMMARY 
The first round of EU Eastern Enlargement occurred on May 1, 
2004, with the accession of ten, mainly Central-Eastern European 
countries. This economic integration brings with it some potential 
East-West migration, to the greatest extent for Germany, but will 
bring benefits for some groups, while at the same time causing 
losses to others. This paper gives an account of some studies that 
estimate this migration potential and evaluate its impacts on the 
labour market and the welfare system in Germany. One major 
finding is that the numbers for migration potentials vary widely 
according to different models. The degree of effect depends 
largely on the types of labour that migrate – highly skilled or 
low-skilled – and which industries they find their jobs in. 
 
 GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
3 CEECs Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
4 CEECs Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia 
4a CEECs Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania 
4b CEECs Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
5 CEECs 3 CEECs plus Estonia and Slovenia. 
7 CEECs Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania 
10 CEECs The ten countries of the first Enlargement round: Cyprus, the Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
10a CEECs The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. 
CEECs All Central-Eastern European countries seen as potential accession coun-
tries in envisaged Enlargement rounds, plus Cyprus and Malta (not geo-
graphically in Central-Eastern Europe. 
CGE model Computational General Equilibrium model. 
DIW Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin. 
EC European Commission. 
EC study Fertig and Schmidt 2000. 
EIC European Integration Consortium. 
EIC/DIW study Boeri and Brücker 2000. 
EU European Union. 
EU 15 Current EU member-states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
EU study Keuschnigg et al. 1999. 
GDP Gross Domestic Product. 
HOS model The Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model. 
IAB Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung. 
IFO Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich. 
IFO study Sinn et al. 2000. 
IfW Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. 
ILO International Labour Organization. 
IZA Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Bonn. 
IZA study Bauer and Zimmermann 1999. 
OIM Osteuropa-Institut, Munich. 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
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INTRODUCTION 
The countries that acceded to the EU in 
the first round of Eastern Enlargement 
on May 1, 2004 (10 CEECs) were Cy-
prus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. They joined 15 
current member-states (the EU 15): Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Germany, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
existing member-state widely thought to 
be affected most by this first round of 
Enlargement is Germany. It has the big-
gest trade with the 10 and it is the big-
gest net contributor to the EU budget. 
Certain direct payments may become a 
computable financial burden on Ger-
many. Some trade benefits may lessen, 
while others have probably applied since 
the 1990s, when the opening of the 
CEECs to the West and gradual removals 
of trade barriers under the Europe 
Agreements had remarkable effects on 
trading activity. 
Furthermore, the German labour 
market and welfare system will be the 
ones affected most by migration flows 
from the acceding countries to Germany. 
Will this post-Enlargement flow of labour 
benefit the German workforce, damage 
it, or do both, depending on the sorts of 
labour that migrate? Can distinctions be 
drawn between industries and between 
geographical areas in Germany, as to 
which will be more affected by migrating 
labour? 
Understandably, the first round of 
Eastern Enlargement has become a con-
troversial topic of public discussion in 
Germany. Public opinion is dominated by 
fears of a surge of immigration surge 
from Eastern Europe into Germany, 
competing with Germans for jobs and 
stoking unemployment rates. Two-thirds 
of the Germans who expect high poten-
tial immigration perceive it negatively – 
in Eastern Germany, more than 80 per 
cent of them do. Similar proportions ex-
pect mounting unemployment and a rise 
in crime. Another 70 per cent fear that 
Enlargement will fuel the black labour 
market and 65 per cent fear the welfare 
system will be exploited. The concern 
about immigration has to be seen against 
the fact that 59 per cent feel there are 
too many foreigners in Germany already. 
The figures reflect special German con-
cern about immigration and cross-border 
commuting: 55 per cent foresee the 
number of commuters to rising sharply, 
which is the main reason why 79 per 
cent fear that unemployment among 
German workers will rise.1 
Much work remains if the German 
population is to be convinced of the po-
tential benefits of Enlargement, especially 
immigration. Yet think of the baneful 
demographic developments in Germany’s 
ageing society today. These could make 
an annual flow of immigrants essential 
for maintaining current rates of eco-
nomic growth? That is one fact being 
ignored amidst a hysterical wave of la-
bour-market protectionism. 
This paper scrutinizes the potential 
migration after the first round of East-
ern Enlargement as computed with vari-
ous models for Germany, and compares 
and evaluates these against the back-
ground just mentioned. Section 1 draws 
implications from migration theories and 
theories of the economic effects of mi-
gration. Section 2 compares various cal-
culations on migration potential for Ger-
many. Section 3 views the incentives to 
migrate produced by the German labour 
market and welfare system and discusses 
the impacts of migration on these. Sec-
tion 4 argues that transitional periods 
with limited movements of labour would 
be a solution. Section 5 sums up the 
                                                 
1 Tuschhoff 2002, 25–9. 
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findings and draws conclusions for the 
future. 
1) IMPLICATIONS OF THEORIES 
OF MIGRATION AND ITS 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
The microeconomic models of migration 
theory assume that individuals want to 
maximize overall benefits in their lives, 
such as consumption of public and pri-
vate goods in each period in a certain 
country, and some certain variables that 
can affect individual benefits: social, cul-
tural and environmental aspects. By dis-
counting future benefits, a present value 
for the period of decision-making is cal-
culated. Individuals decide to migrate if 
the present value of benefits in the des-
tination country, subtracted from the mi-
gration costs, exceeds the present value 
of benefits in the home country. Since 
individual evaluation of risks connected 
with the benefits is affected by uncer-
tainty, information about life and work-
ing conditions in the home and the des-
tination country, and the degree of indi-
vidual risk aversion has high importance. 
Some models consider individual benefits 
as incomes, and migration costs as fixed 
costs, i.e. costs of moving assets and 
psychological costs. Thus individuals face 
an investment calculation for their indi-
vidual human capital and will migrate if 
the present value of the income differen-
tial exceeds the fixed costs. Incomes are 
furthermore weighted with an individual 
probability of becoming unemployed, 
which is strongly influenced by unem-
ployment rates. Individual expectations of 
these probabilities and the option of 
waiting are therefore of major impor-
tance where changes in some variables, 
such as wage level, are expected. An-
other factor that strongly affects deci-
sions on whether to migrate or not is 
the heterogeneity of migrants in their 
labour skills. Assuming just the two 
categories – highly skilled and low-skilled 
– there will be strong impact from indi-
vidual information on wage differentials 
between these categories in the destina-
tion and home country, from individual 
perceptions of own skills and probability 
of potential employers recognizing such 
skills, or which level of skills they as-
sume. With information asymmetries, the 
average wage level of immigrants gives a 
perspective. The development of average 
wage levels among immigrants depends 
on the relation between highly skilled 
and low-skilled labour. Thus the skill 
range of migrants affects their wage in-
comes after migration, which in return 
affects incentives to further migrants and 
determines future migration potentials.2 
Theoretical models of migration dis-
cuss its impact on wages and employ-
ment in the destination country. The 
EIC/DIW study3 points out that in open 
economies, migration-induced additional 
supplies of labour in the destination 
country are not necessarily associated 
with a shift in relative wages. Relative 
wages stay unaffected if marginal labour 
demand is dominated by an industry 
producing tradable goods and facing 
elastic demand on world markets. If, for 
example, marginal demand for low-
skilled labour in a country is dominated 
by textile industries that take world 
market prices as given, immigration by 
low-skilled labour increases production 
and exports of textiles, while wages re-
main stable. On the other hand, if mar-
ginal demand for low-skilled labour is 
dominated by an industry producing 
non-tradable goods, like services, which 
face fairly inelastic demand, an addi-
tional supply of low-skilled labour 
probably results in a decline in relative 
wages in that industry. But the authors 
add that empirical research on the im-
pacts of migration has found very mod-
                                                 
2 Sinn et al. 2000, 24–30. 
3 Boeri and Brücker 2000. 
 7
erate impacts on inter-regional and inter-
industrial wage differentials.4 
2) POTENTIAL MIGRATION TO 
GERMANY 
The authors of the IFO study for the 
German Ministry of Labour5 point to 
three theoretic types of incentives for 
migration from the CEECs to the EU 15 
that makes Germany a probable destina-
tion country for the majority of mi-
grants. Incentives are seen as resulting 
mainly from income differentials between 
the home and the destination country 
and the expectations migrants have 
about the development of wage levels. As 
the wage differentials in the private sec-
tors of some CEECs are much wider 
than in Germany, incentives to migrate 
to Germany result, especially for low-
skilled labour. Another important source 
of migration incentives, especially among 
low-skilled workers, is the social redistri-
bution of incomes in Germany and its 
effects. But the authors also mention an-
other, less obvious incentive. The pres-
ence of networks built up by immigrants 
in the destination country reduces the 
psychological distance from the home 
country and can give initial information 
on the labour market, help build up a 
social network, and facilitate access to 
social services. These networks intensify 
migration incentives, especially in Ger-
many, as the figures on allocation of 
CEEC migrants presented in this section 
indicate.6 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 24–5. 
5 Sinn et al. 2000. 
6 Ibid., xvi-xvii. 
2.1. Migration past and potential 
To uncover the migration prospects from 
the CEECs to Germany calls for some 
demographic and economic figures on 
wage levels and unemployment rates in 
both. Then some studies of these will be 
considered. 
In 1990–97, 585,000 migrants ar-
rived in Germany from the 10 CEECs, 
where they make up some 0.7 per cent 
of Germany’s population.7 The majority 
settled in the Eastern regions of Bavaria 
bordering the Czech Republic and Aus-
tria, where make up an average of 1.0–
2.5 per cent of all employees, as op-
posed to an all-Germany average of 
some 0.5 per cent, with many regions 
below that.8 Furthermore, in 1998, 
555,000 (65 per cent) of the 853,000 
residents from the 10 CEECs in the EU 
were living in Germany, with Austria (12 
per cent), Italy (4 per cent) and UK (4 
per cent) far behind.9 This demographic 
background provides strong arguments 
for remarkable migration potential to 
Germany following Enlargement. 
An IZA report10 also analyses Ger-
many’s structure of population to give 
further arguments for migration. In 
1996, 8.90 per cent of all citizens in 
Germany were foreigners, which was 
way above the EU 15 average of 4.65 
per cent. Germany’s absolute number of 
7.3 million foreigners amounted to 40 
per cent of the EU 15 total 1996. Fur-
thermore, the proportion of EU 15 for-
eigners in Germany remained quite sta-
ble, at 2.0 per cent in 1985, 1.9 in 
1990, 2.2 in 1995 and 2.3 in 1998, 
while that of non-EU foreigners rose 
from 3.6 per cent in 1985, to 4.2 in 
                                                 
7 Brücker et al. 2000. 
8 Weise et al. 2001, 114. 
9 Boeri and Brücker 2000, 46. 
10 Fertig and Schmidt 2002. 
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1990, 6.4 in 1995 and 6.7 in 1998.11 
The demographic advantage to Germany 
of strong migration cannot be denied, 
but other studies that consider further 
aspects of migration reach different 
conclusions. 
Another report IZA12 looks at Ger-
many’s structure of immigration since 
1950, to shed light on the possible struc-
ture of immigration from Eastern 
Enlargement. The authors conclude that 
immigrants to Germany have traditionally 
been mostly young male workers and 
they expect this pattern to remain. The 
report mentions that Germany experi-
enced a decade of high birth rates in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, whereas 
the 4 CEECs faced a similar baby boom 
directly after World War II. So the 
population structures of these CEECs and 
Germany differ considerably at the end 
of the 20th century. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, Germany had a relatively 
large 20–29 cohort, whereas the CEECs 
face bigger proportions below the age of 
20. These people make up the future 
migration potential for Germany, the au-
thors conclude. Furthermore, stable mor-
tality rates and sharply declining birth 
rates in the CEECs in the 1990s will 
moderate future migration pressure, al-
though the authors expect relatively high 
fertility rates in the CEECs in the fu-
ture.13 
For further evidence of comparable 
events during earlier historic Enlarge-
ments, let us look at the EU Southern 
Enlargement by Spain and Portugal in 
1986. Like the Eastern Enlargement, it 
was followed by a seven-year period of 
restricted labour movement of labour, as 
explained later. During this transitional 
period, about 1000 Spanish and 6000 
Portuguese workers a year received EU 
work permits, resulting in very modest 
migration flows. In fact, there was a net 
reduction in the number of Spanish 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 3–5. 
12 Fertig and Schmidt 2000. 
13 Ibid., 12–16. 
workers in Germany, as there was also 
migration from the EU to Spain and Por-
tugal, of some 15,000 workers a year. 
Even in the early 1990s, after the transi-
tion periods, migration from Spain re-
mained stable, while Portuguese migra-
tion further increased to an annual level 
of 30,000, of whom Germany absorbed 
50 per cent.14 
The IFO study foresees low and de-
creasing migration incentives for low-
skilled workers from the 10 CEECs to 
Germany. The authors argue that most 
of the past migration to Germany took 
place at a time of high economic growth 
and low unemployment in Germany, re-
sulting in high demand for low-skilled 
foreign workers. At the beginning of the 
21st century, however, general economic 
conditions worsened, as demand for low-
skilled immigrants decreased, unemploy-
ment correspondingly rose, and wage 
levels declined. The resulting immigration 
into unemployment causes high migration 
costs, as unemployed migrants do not 
receive public transfers in the destination 
country immediately after immigration. In 
addition, decreasing wages in the desti-
nation country lower the income gap for 
low-skilled workers and thus reduce mi-
gration incentives.15 
So some arguments that predict 
significant migration potential to Ger-
many from Eastern Enlargement coincide 
with others that foresee less remarkable 
migration. The following subsections pre-
sent Germany’s stakes in migration and 
the precise results of a model calculation 
on Germany’s migration potential. 
2.2. Germany’s stakes                
in migration 
Public and political opinion in Germany 
on the impacts of post-Eastern Enlarge-
ment immigration can be called hysterical 
                                                 
14 European Commission 2001, 14–15. 
15 Sinn et al. 2000, 40–45 and 76. 
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protectionism that ignores the need for 
immigration engendered by the demo-
graphic developments. 
The IZA report covers population 
movements in Germany in the year of 
1999. There were 9.3 births and 10.3 
deaths per 1000, giving a natural de-
crease of 1 per 1000. The overall popu-
lation growth of 1.5 – still below the EU 
15 average – could only result from net 
migration of 2.5. The EU population 
showed natural growth of 0.7 and over-
all growth of 2.6 persons per 1000.16 
The authors of a working paper 
for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung17 use 
these demographic tendencies in Germany 
to underline positive effects of Enlarge-
ment for the German economy. They in-
troduce the results of a study by the 
IAB, which also highlight huge demo-
graphic problems on the German labour 
market and in the social insurance sys-
tem. Since Germany has an ageing soci-
ety, the study argues, an annual decline 
in the labour supply of 200,000 persons 
results in a cut in the number of people 
employed by 14 million over the first 
half of the 21st century, which is one 
third of today’s number. Remarkable 
problems for the pension system and the 
public health insurance system will be 
inevitable. Even net immigration of some 
300,000 people a year would result in a 
ratio of employed to pensioners of 10:8 
by 2050, which is half today’s ratio. 
Also affected is the labour market. While 
the 4.0 million unemployed are decreas-
ing only for demographic reasons, there 
are still some 1.45 million vacancies, 
which immigration of highly skilled la-
bour could alleviate. Even among the 
medium-skilled labour that makes up one 
of Germany’s strengths traditionally, some 
6500–7000 electrical engineers a year 
are needed and 12 per cent of all jobs 
in the classic production sector are va-
cant. Against a background of 4 million 
unemployed, the authors still find a need 
                                                 
16 Fertig and Schmidt 2002, 3–5. 
17 Freudenstein and Tewes 2001. 
for low-skilled labour, as in Germany 
most of the seasonal work in vineyards 
and agriculture is done by immigrants. 
The authors conclude that there are no-
table German stakes in migration to fol-
low EU Enlargement, which can foster 
innovation and flexibility by offsetting the 
ageing of the population.18 
A study for the HypoVereinsbank19 
also emphasizes Germany’s demographic 
gap. The author argues with birth-deficit 
figures, concluding that Germany needs 
450,000 net immigrants a year20 to pre-
vent long-term decline in the population. 
When the baby-boomers reach parent-
hood, the birth deficit will jump from 
100,000 to 700,000 by 2050. 
2.3. An econometric model on 
migration potential for Germany 
This subsection presents the results of an 
econometric model of the migration po-
tential for Germany from Eastern 
Enlargement, calculated for the EIC/DIW 
study. This model was chosen extensively 
because its assumptions seem closest to 
reality and its findings around the aver-
age of all calculations. The next subsec-
tion updates the results with a follow-up 
study that shows only slightly disparities. 
Some results of other studies are then 
compared. 
The EIC/DIW study assumes that 
the human capital-investment theory men-
tioned in Section 2.1, with potential mi-
grants calculating present values of ex-
pected and uncertain future costs and 
benefits from migration. Interestingly, this 
study explicitly considers how the pro-
pensity to migrate is allocated unevenly 
among people, resulting in country-
specific shares of the population being 
willing to migrate, with income differen-
tials. As soon as these people have mi-
                                                 
18 Ibid., 4–7. 
19 Hueck 2003. 
20 The actual number in 2002 was 250,000. 
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grated, net migration declines to zero. 
That makes future immigration a func-
tion of income differentials (GDP per 
capita at PPP), employment prospects 
(highly dependent on unemployment 
rates), individual factors (a country-
specific dummy-variable, indicating cul-
tural aspects), the stock of past immi-
grants settled in the country, and institu-
tional factors (the degree to which mi-
gration of labour is institutionally lim-
ited).21 The study makes an econometric 
analysis of migration potentials from the 
10a CEECs, calculating a long-term equi-
librium for stocks of immigrants to 
Germany, helped by historical data on 
migration to Germany from 18 countries: 
the EU 15, Norway, Switzerland, former 
Yugoslavia, Turkey and the United States 
in 1967–98. However, the authors men-
tion several reasons why the results of 
past migration movements from the 18 
countries considered in 1967–98 can only 
project to a limited extent 10a CEECs 
migration potentials to Germany in the 
21st century. Most past migration hap-
pened in a time of economic growth and 
hardly any unemployment, while Ger-
many’s income differentials with the 
CEECs are much greater than with the 
18 countries in this study. So the authors 
emphasize that the data input cannot 
give a precise forecast for Enlargement 
migration. For the calculation of migra-
tion potential from the 10a CEECs, the 
study conducts three scenarios of the 
development of income differentials. The 
results are average numbers that can 
vary widely with business cycles. This 
subsection presents the baseline scenario 
and the next the higher and the lower 
ones.22 
In the baseline scenario, GDP per 
capita in Germany grows by an annual 
average of 2 per cent and in the 10a 
                                                 
21 Brücker 2000. The study assumes unlimited 
movement of labour from 2002 onwards in all 
its three scenarios. See Section 5 for further dis-
cussion. 
22 Brücker 2000; Table 1. 
CEECs23 by 4 per cent. This cuts income 
differentials by 50 per cent over the 
next 35 years, with unemployment rates 
stable at the 1988 rate for Germany and 
the 1998 rate for the 10a CEECs. The 
outcome is an annual increase in the 
number of residents from the 10a CEECs 
in Germany of about 218,000 in 2002, 
declining to about 162,000 in 2005, 
95,600 in 2010, 27,500 in 2020 and 
1,500 in 2030. There will be an aggre-
gate increase of around 2,000,000 resi-
dents from the 10a CEECs in Germany 
over the 2002–30 period, of which 
1,355,000 are expected to migrate be-
fore 2010. Added the stock of past im-
migrants, there will be altogether 
2,500,000 residents from the 10a CEECs 
in Germany by 2030, making up 3.5 per 
cent of Germany’s population. Extrapolat-
ing these results onto the EU 15 shows 
about 3,000,000 migrants expected by 
2030, with Germany taking two-thirds of 
the migration potential. The authors con-
clude that migration to Germany will 
increase as a result of Eastern Enlarge-
ment, but it will be distributed over a 
long period and decrease until almost 
zero by 2030, when the long-term equi-
librium for the migration stock is 
reached.24 
Still, there are three aspects of 
events in the recent past that may 
change the projected results considerably. 
(1) Unlimited movement of labour, as-
sumed in the EIC/DIW study, is not re-
alistic, as the EU Council, at its meeting 
in Copenhagen in 2002, proposed a pe-
riod of limitation of the free movement 
of up to seven years,25 after strong 
pressure from Germany. (2) The first 
Eastern Enlargement actually took place 
on May 1, 2004, not in 2002 as the 
study assumes. These two changes may 
have a notable impact on the calculation 
or simply postpone the migration poten-
                                                 
23 This gives a convergence rate of 2 per cent a 
year for income differentials. 
24 Ibid.; Table 1. 
25 The same applied with Southern Enlargement 
in 1986. 
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tials – more on that in Section 4. Finally, 
Malta and Cyprus, not Romania and 
Bulgaria, have joined the first round, 
which reduces the migration potentials to 
Germany, as Romania, after Poland, 
takes the biggest share of potential mi-
grants in this calculation: 605,000 (30 
per cent).26 
2.4. More extreme scenarios – 
an approach using sensitivity 
analysis 
The factors that shift in this attempt at 
sensitivity analysis are the underlying un-
employment rates and the rate of in-
come-differential convergence. Assuming 
stable unemployment rates in Germany 
(at the rate of 1988) and the 10a CEECs 
(at the rate of 1998) and a convergence 
rate for the income differentials of 2 per 
cent a year, a low-projection scenario 
presumes unemployment rates of 10 per 
cent for Germany and 5 per cent for 
the 10a CEECs and a convergence rate 
of 3 per cent a year. The results show 
far fewer immigrants to Germany: an 
annual 175,000 in 2002, declining to 
12,000 in 2020 and even a following 
migration of 7,000 a year up to 2030, 
giving an aggregate of only 1,375,000 
immigrants to Germany, compared with 
2,000,000 according to the baseline sce-
nario. 
The high-projection scenario, assum-
ing unemployment rates of 5 per cent 
for Germany and 15 per cent for the 
10a CEECs and a convergence rate of 1 
per cent p.a. for the income differentials, 
produces results of far more migrants.27 
Starting with some 241,000 a year in 
2002 and declining to 69,000 in 2010 
and 11,600 in 2030, the aggregate of 
2,500,000 substantially exceeds the 
                                                 
26 Brücker 2000; Boeri and Brücker 2000, 121–
4; Table 1. 
27 If incomes in the CEECs converge on EU in-
comes by only 1 per cent instead of 3 per cent, 
more people migrate. 
2,000,000 from the baseline scenario 
and the 1,375,000 from the low-
projection scenario.28 
An update of the EIC/DIW study 
conducted in 200329 widely confirmed its 
results. The net increase in the number 
of foreign residents from the 10a 
CEECs30 in Germany – which roughly 
equals the net migration flow – was es-
timated at 180,000 after the introduction 
of free movement of labour and was 
expected to peak at about 225,000 im-
migrants a year later. The overall long-
term migration potential is calculated at 
2,300,000 immigrants, reached about 25 
years after the introduction of free 
movement. These are the results of the 
baseline scenario. The update study re-
tains the basic three-scenario structure of 
the EIC/DIW study, but with the under-
lying unemployment rates adjusted to the 
average for 1990–2001. In the high-
migration scenario, the initial net in-
crease in the foreign population in Ger-
many is expected to be between 215,000 
and 230,000, with a long-term potential 
of 2,800,000 immigrants. In the low-
migration scenario, initial net migration 
is estimated at 150,000 and the long-
term aggregate at 1,970,000. Over 70 
per cent of these migration flows are 
expected to come from the 8 CEECs31 of 
the first Enlargement round and less 
than 30 per cent from Bulgaria and 
Romania. That would lead to an overall 
migration potential, from the 8 CEECs32 
actually joining on May 1, 2004, of 
1,610,000 immigrants in the baseline, 
1,960,000 in the high and 1,380,000 in 
the low-projection scenario.33 
                                                 
28 Brücker 2000; Boeri and Brücker 2000, 121–
4; Table 1. 
29 Alvarez-Plata et al. 2003. 
30 This update is still based on an Enlargement 
by 10a CEECs (including Bulgaria and Romania). 
31 The 10 CEECs except Cyprus and Malta. 
32 Migration from Malta and Cyprus is consid-
ered negligible. 
33 Ibid., 38–9. 
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2.5. A comparison of different 
models giving different results 
This subsection presents further calcula-
tions of migration potentials for Germany 
from the first round of Eastern Enlarge-
ment, using three other models. These 
project different migrant totals from a 
background of different assumptions. 
An IZA study conducted in 1999 
for the British Department for Education 
and Employment34 in 1999 comes to very 
similar results to the EIC/DIW study. 
The authors derive their estimates of 
gross post-Enlargement migration to the 
EU 15 from 7 CEECs from four different 
data channels: (1) data on East-West mi-
gration after the opening of the CEECs 
in the 1990s, (2) own surveys conducted 
in the CEECs, (3) a qualitative evaluation 
based on economic and demographic 
conditions in Eastern and Western 
Europe, and (4) an econometric simula-
tion model based on data from the 1986 
EU Southern Enlargement. Their results 
say that there will be some 200,000 mi-
grants annually making up 0.05 per 
cent of the EU 15 population. Within a 
period of 15 years, 2–3 per cent of the 
total population of the CEECs35 are likely 
to migrate to the EU 15, i.e. 2,000,000–
3,000,000 people. Two-thirds – 
1,300,000–2,000,000 – will settle in 
Germany because of existing networks of 
immigrants, which the authors evaluate 
as negligible, since there were about 
800,00036 immigrants settling in Ger-
many in 1980–90. The authors mention 
that there will additionally be a large 
number of migrants returning to their 
home country, resulting in lower num-
bers for net migration to Germany.37 
                                                 
34 Bauer and Zimmermann 1999. 
35 About 100 million people. 
36 Equivalent to 1 per cent of Germany’s popula-
tion. 
37 Bauer and Zimmermann 1999, 31–45. 
A study published by the European 
Commission (EC)38 in 2000 calculates a 
migration potential based on demo-
graphic, rather than economic factors. 
The authors prefer to fix economic vari-
ables and individual migration tendencies 
at the time of calculation and emphasize 
the relevance of stocks of immigrants in 
a destination country building up net-
works. The study considers demographic 
developments in the CEECs compared to 
Germany after World War II, highlight-
ing different timings for baby booms, 
resulting in different population struc-
tures today, and turning the CEECs into 
ageing societies with a reduced willing-
ness to migrate. Using this data, rates of 
net migration in the 4 CEECs for the 
whole population and the core below-40 
age group that is willing to migrate first 
are calculated, using three main scenar-
ios. The first rests on the post-World 
War II emigration rate of 3 per cent 
for the 4 CEECs, resulting in a negligible 
14,000–18,000 migrants from the 4 
CEECs reaching Germany each year and 
for the 1998–2017 period a total of 
293,000–360,000. The second scenario 
considers future demographic develop-
ments in the CEECs and calculates some 
15,000–57,000 migrants a year and 
302,000–1,147,000 by 2017. The third 
scenario is based on a 4 per cent emi-
gration rate for the core age group, 
leading 48,000–63,000 immigrants a 
year to enter Germany, with an aggre-
gate of 970,000–1,250,000 for 1998–
2017. If we project the results of the 10 
CEECs calculations in the EIC/DIW and 
IZA studies onto the 4 CEECs calculation 
in the EC study, its results give about 
the same numbers. The upper limit of 
1,250,000 calculated by the EC study 
exactly fits the 1,250,000 of a EIC/DIW 
4 CEECs variant and just exceeds the 
800,000–1,200,000 for a 4 CEECs-
adjusted IZA study.39 
                                                 
38 Fertig and Schmidt 2000, 12–26; published as 
an ‘Information Note’ on 06/03/2003. 
39 Ibid., 12–26. 
 13
However, the results of the IFO 
study40 finally presented here exceed 
greatly the results of the other studies.41 
The econometric simulation here is based 
on a CGE model. The study considers EU 
accession of 5 CEECs in 2002, with 
unlimited movement of labour, based on 
migration data from Turkey and migra-
tion results from the 1986 EU Southern 
Enlargement. The calculations of migra-
tion potentials based on income differen-
tials at PPP are grouped in scenarios: a 
relative income growth of 2 per cent in 
the CEECs, or stable income development. 
Subtracting the figures for Romania from 
the model outcomes for 2002–17, the 
study still suggests 2,100,000–2,700,000 
immigrants for Germany from the 4b 
CEECs, those with the biggest shares of 
the 10 CEECs’ population. Although, the 
authors say it is hardly possible to cal-
culate these results in a time series, one 
can conclude that there will be 120,000–
150,000 immigrants a year in the early 
years, which projects onto the 10a 
CEECs42 as 250,000–300,000. However, 
irrespective of the development of the 
income differentials, the study suggests 
an annual 200,000–250,000 immigrants 
into Germany in the first years, which 
will be even higher if the migration is 
concentrated in those years.43 In an up-
date, the authors try to adjust the re-
sults to the 8 CEECs and they calculate 
a longer-term migration potential of 
2,500,000-3,300,000 for Germany.44 
These numbers exceed even the 
1,960,000 of the high-projection scenario 
of the EIC/DIW update made for the 8 
CEECs. To make a further reasonable 
comparison possible, let us adjust the 
results to the 4b CEECs of the other 
studies. The 2.1–2.7 million immigrants 
up to 2017, forecast in the IFO study, 
greatly exceed the 1.25 million calculated 
                                                 
40 Sinn et al. 2000. 
41 See also Table 1. 
42 This includes Romania and Bulgaria, not Malta 
and Cyprus. 
43 Ibid.; Table 1. 
44 Sinn and Werding 2001, 42; Table 1. 
in the EIC/DIW study and the EC study, 
and leave far behind the IZA study, with 
its 0.8–1.2 million immigrants for Ger-
many. The IFO study explains this huge 
gap in the results by a methodological 
difference in compiling and interpreting 
the data used by the IFO and the DIW, 
since the data itself turns out to be simi-
lar. The difference is said to lie in the 
stress put on either the cross-country 
data or the time-series data: the long-
term migration potential depends either 
on the cross-country income differentials 
or the income differentials among busi-
ness cycles.45 Further evaluation of this 
gap is left an open question. 
The conclusion must be that a first-
round migration flow of 2,000,000–
3,300,000 from the 8 CEECs seems the 
absolute maximum to be expected in 
Germany. But it leaves open the question 
how the three aspects of recent events 
mentioned in Subsection 3.3, especially 
the limitation of free movement of la-
bour, could change the actual impacts. 
More on that follows later, but first, let 
us continue with the impacts of the mi-
gration on Germany’s economy. 
3) EFFECTS OF MIGRATION 
POTENTIALS IN GERMANY 
This section discusses impacts of the cal-
culated migration potentials on the Ger-
man labour market and the welfare sys-
tem. A major result will be that the de-
gree of effect depends greatly on the 
skill types of labour that migrate and 
the destination industries. 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 43; Table 1. 
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3.1. The German labour market 
This subsection on the impacts on the 
German labour market begins with an 
introduction to the labour markets in the 
CEECs and the EU, showing employment 
structures and wage levels. 
3.1.1. Employment and wage-
structure comparisons 
The IFO study analyses the employment 
structures in Germany and the 5 CEECs. 
The structures in these countries changed 
a lot in the 1990s, as employment in the 
service sectors rose sharply while jobs in 
the processing industries, agriculture and 
fisheries fell by more than twice that 
amount, so forcing the transformation 
process into the tertiary sectors. How-
ever, employment in agriculture in-
creased in Poland and Romania in the 
1990s, to shares of 25 and 37 per cent 
of employment respectively in 1998. The 
share of agriculture was much smaller 
in Slovakia (7.8 per cent), Hungary (7.5 
per cent) and the Czech Republic (5.4 
per cent), although all three remained 
above the EU 15 average of 4.8 per 
cent. The sharpest decline in the process-
ing industries was faced by Romania in 
the 1990s (-39 per cent), leaving a re-
maining share of 33 per cent – less than 
the 41 per cent in the Czech Republic 
and just slightly above the EU 15 aver-
age of 30 per cent. The service sector 
continues to grow in the CEECs. It al-
ready accounts for high shares of em-
ployment in the Czech Republic (54 per 
cent), Slovakia (51 per cent), Poland (45 
per cent), Romania (33 per cent), and 
Hungary (the biggest of all at 58 per 
cent, but still well below the EU 15 av-
erage of 66 per cent.46 
                                                 
46 Sinn et al. 2000, 51–73. 
As far as employee qualifications 
are concerned, the IFO study points out 
that in Germany as well as the 5 CEECs, 
employment of highly skilled workers in-
creased in the 1980s and 1990s, while 
employment of low-skilled workers de-
creased. Average educational and skill 
levels in the 5 CEECs is much higher 
than in Greece, Spain or Portugal, ex-
cept in the case of Romania. The educa-
tional structure in the Czech Republic is 
very similar to Germany’s, although the 
proportion of the population in Germany 
with tertiary educational attainment is 
generally bigger than in the CEECs. All 
in all, the structure of qualifications and 
the unemployment in the 5 CEECs is bi-
ased towards low-skilled jobs, relative to 
Germany, but a closer look at the struc-
ture of unemployment shows that unem-
ployment in Germany is concentrated on 
low-skilled workers. In 1999, 24 per 
cent of low-skilled workers were unem-
ployed, as opposed to 9.5 per cent of all 
workers. In some Eastern regions with 
the highest unemployment rates in Ger-
many, 55 per cent of the low-skilled 
workers were unemployed in 1997. For-
eigners in Germany are mainly low-
skilled workers, although the proportion 
of these among those from the 5 CEECs 
is lower than for other nationals in 
Germany, such as Turks and former 
Yugoslavs. For 77 per cent of all unem-
ployed foreigners in Germany in 1997 
had no qualifications at all.47 
Looking at the unemployment rates, 
it becomes obvious that there is still a 
huge gap for some CEECs, although oth-
ers have kept up with Germany. In 
2002, the rates were 3.2 per cent in 
Cyprus, 7.3 per cent in the Czech Re-
public, 10.3 per cent in Estonia, 5.8 per 
cent in Hungary, 12.0 per cent in Latvia, 
14.0 per cent in Lithuania, 5.2 per cent 
in Malta, 19.7 per cent in Poland, 18.5 
per cent in Slovakia, 6.4 per cent in 
Slovenia, 17.8 per cent in Bulgaria, 8.4 
per cent in Romania, and 10.3 per cent 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
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in Turkey.48 In Germany, the comparable 
overall unemployment rate in 2002 was 
8.7 per cent,49 so that employment con-
ditions look better in Germany only for 
some people from the CEECs; for many 
they look worse than at home. 
The situation looks quite similar 
with wage levels. In 1995, the average 
wage level in the 10a CEECs was at 8.9 
per cent of the EU 15 average and 7.6 
per cent of Germany’s wage level.50 But 
there is strong variation between the 10a 
CEECs. Bulgaria’s wage levels were 3.3 
per cent of Germany’s in 1995, Latvia’s 
4.9 per cent, Slovakia’s 7.0 per cent, 
Hungary they were at 9.0 per cent and 
at 27.7 per cent in Slovenia. The large 
differences in nominal wages in the 
CEECs and EU do not only reflect differ-
ences in labour productivity. They are 
also a function of varying exchange 
rates. Average real wages in the 10a 
CEECs are about 20 per cent of the re-
spective levels in the EU, according to 
PPP estimates by the World Bank.51 
The different structures of the la-
bour market in the CEECs and in Ger-
many indicate that there is a huge po-
tential for convergence resulting from 
labour migration following an EU Eastern 
Enlargement. The next subsection consid-
ers whether the migration potentials cal-
culated above can have an impact on 
Germany’s labour market that brings 
converging developments. 
3.1.2. The impacts of migration on 
Germany’s labour market 
Immigration of foreign labour does not 
necessarily have a detrimental effect on 
domestic workers. Economic theories 
suggest that in open economies, the ef-
fects of migration on wages and em-
                                                 
48 European Commission 2003, 25–183. 
49 laborsta.ilo.org. Calculated on the standard of 
the International Labour Organization for all 
aged 15 and older. 
50 Table 3. 
51 Boeri and Brücker 2000, 13–14; Table 3. 
ployment can be neutral, but they can 
also affect inter-industrial wage differen-
tials and displacement risks. The wage 
and employment effects of migration may 
not be spread equally over the work-
force. Employees with substitutive human-
capital endowments in relation to immi-
grants may lose by immigration, while 
those with complementary human-capital 
endowments may benefit. And the results 
depend much on the skill structure of 
the immigrants. This subsection presents 
the results of several studies on the im-
pacts of immigration on the German la-
bour market. The consensus opinion 
turns out to be that the results depend 
on the qualifications of the immigrants 
and the flexibility of the German labour 
market, and that they may well be less 
threatening than they are often predicted 
to be in public discussion. 
According to the IFO study,52 the in-
flexibility of the German labour market 
will mean that an additional supply of 
labour, at least in the short term, will 
increase unemployment rates rather than 
decrease wage levels. The study arrives 
at six further findings. (1) The qualifica-
tion structure of the immigrants from 
the CEECs will continue to be biased to-
wards highly skilled workers, by com-
parison with other immigrant nationali-
ties. (2) Increasing immigration from the 
CEECs will put pressure on wages in 
some parts of the German labour mar-
ket, especially in low-skilled jobs in proc-
essing industries. Impacts on the general 
wage level may be positive, but a wider 
wage structure may have negative im-
pacts on income allocation in Germany. 
Pressure on wage levels is expected to 
appear in industries where domestic 
workers are substitutive, rather than 
complementary to immigrant workers. 
The authors expect such crowding-out 
effects for low-skilled workers in Ger-
many’s manufacturing and construction 
industries. For low-skilled workers in 
services, the authors foresee minor 
                                                 
52 Sinn et al. 2000. 
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crowding-out effects, since relations be-
tween domestic and immigrant workers 
there are complementary. The study 
points in general to the impacts on wage 
levels and employment being strongly de-
pendent on the skill levels of the immi-
grants. Incomes of low-skilled workers 
decrease and incomes of highly skilled 
workers slightly increase if the immi-
grants are mainly low-skilled workers, 
whereas incomes of highly skilled work-
ers slightly decrease and incomes of low-
skilled workers increase if the immi-
grants are mainly highly skilled workers. 
In the past, relatively highly skilled im-
migrants from the CEECs were mainly 
employed in relatively low-skilled jobs. 
But if they can manage in the future to 
be employed in highly skilled jobs, ac-
cording to their level of skills, they may 
thereby reduce the peak levels of wages 
in such highly skilled jobs as IT. (3) Im-
migration from the CEECs will intensify 
expansion of the service sector in Ger-
many, since more and more immigrants 
are employed in the service sector and 
immigration increases growth and em-
ployment rates in the long term, by in-
creasing allocation efficiency and con-
sumption. 4) In the long term, employ-
ment for immigrants will become ad-
justed to their skill levels, whereas in the 
short term, highly skilled and low-skilled 
immigrants will compete for the same 
jobs. 5) Immigration of commuters im-
plies long-term chances, but also risks 
for the labour markets of the regions 
directly bordering the CEECs. 6) With its 
commuters, the CEECs can function as a 
reserve and a buffer for the German 
labour market, which in the long term 
will be burdened by an ageing society 
and therefore happy to welcome young 
workers from the CEECs.53 
A study from the OIM54 also em-
phasizes the relevant relation between 
domestic and immigrant workers, with 
immigration of substituting workers de-
                                                 
53 Ibid., 108–19. 
54 Dietz et al. 2000. 
creasing domestic wage levels and immi-
gration of complementary workers tend-
ing to increase them. It also highlights 
the importance of the skill levels of im-
migrants and reaches the same conclu-
sions as the IFO study on domestic wage 
levels. The authors mention a study on 
Germany that shows the results of a 1 
per cent increase of employment by gen-
eral immigrants making domestic wages 
of all workers decline by 0.35 per cent, 
with a 0.45 per cent decline for low-
skilled wages and a 0.12 per cent in-
crease for highly skilled wages. They 
mention another study that models a 1 
per cent increase in domestic labour by 
low-skilled immigrants, with stable un-
employment rates resulting in a 3.1 per 
cent decline of the low-skilled wages and 
a 0.5 per cent increase of highly skilled 
wages. However, if the immigrants are 
mainly highly skilled workers, wages of 
low-skilled workers rise by 0.8 per cent, 
whereas wages of highly skilled workers 
fall by 0.5 per cent. As far as unem-
ployment is concerned, the authors em-
phasize that studies have not found any 
strong impacts of immigration on unem-
ployment in the destination country, 
apart from a slight tendency to increase 
unemployment among low-skilled work-
ers.55 
Another OIM study56 also empha-
sizes that the impacts on the German 
labour market will be moderate and 
mainly low-skilled workers will be af-
fected. The study recalls the economic 
theories stating that in open economies, 
immigration of labour does not affect 
domestic income allocation, so long as 
marginal export demand is dominated by 
an industry with tradable output and 
elastic demand on world markets. In this 
case, immigrating labour serves addi-
tional demand on world markets and 
domestic incomes remain unaffected. The 
industries with non-tradable output, 
though, face decreasing wages and in-
                                                 
55 Ibid., 45–6. 
56 Quaisser 2001. 
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creasing unemployment. The study men-
tions results of econometric estimations 
of the impacts of a 1 per cent increase 
in the share of foreigners in Germany. 
Wages would decline by 0.6 per cent 
and the probability of unemployment 
would rise by 1.8 per cent. Low-skilled 
workers, especially in regions directly 
bordering the CEECs, will face sharper 
income cuts than highly skilled ones.57 
The EIC/DIW study also mentions 
the substituting and complementary as-
pects of highly skilled and low-skilled 
workers and the relevance of the skill 
structure of immigrants. The authors 
build up two scenarios. In the first sce-
nario, it is presumed that the immigrants 
are all low-skilled workers. If wages are 
flexible, they decrease so much that 1 
per cent (of the population) immigration 
keeps the incomes and unemployment 
rate of low-skilled workers stable. 
Whereas, if wages are rigid – domestic 
workers are substitutive by immigrants – 
incomes of domestic workers decrease by 
0.65 per cent. Furthermore, immigration 
can have a huge impact on income allo-
cation. If immigration of low-skilled 
workers makes wages decline so that 
unemployment rates remain constant, in-
comes of low-skilled workers decrease by 
3.1 per cent and incomes of highly 
skilled workers increase by 0.5 per cent. 
In the second scenario, all immigrants 
are highly skilled workers. The comple-
mentary relation between highly skilled 
and low-skilled workers in this case 
makes demand for low-skilled workers 
increase. The development of wage levels 
still depends on the degree of rigidity. 
So immigration of highly skilled workers 
can increase the incomes of low-skilled 
workers, but with allocation effects pre-
sent. If wages are flexible, incomes of 
low-skilled workers will increase by 0.8 
per cent, whereas those of highly skilled 
workers will decrease by 0.5 per cent, 
leaving unemployment rates stable. How-
ever, if wages are rigid, unemployment 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 48. 
of low-skilled workers is sharply reduced 
and incomes of domestic workers in-
crease by 1.38 per cent, in the case of 1 
per cent immigration. The DIW calcu-
lated in another study58 that an increase 
of 1 per cent in the share of foreigners 
in Germany makes wages of domestic 
workers decrease by 0.62 per cent in a 
period of five years. In that case, low-
skilled workers face sharper losses than 
highly skilled ones. The EIC/DIW study 
refers to these results and breaks down 
the 0.6 per cent reduction in wages into 
skill segments. This shows wages of low-
skilled workers declining by 1.6 per cent 
and those of highly skilled workers de-
clining by just 0.1 per cent.59 
However, the author of the other 
study from the DIW60 mentions that the 
impacts on unemployment are less strong 
than those on wages. Taking the results 
of a study that shows a 0.24 per cent 
increase of regional unemployment rates 
in Germany in the period of 1988-1993 
resulting from immigration, the author 
concludes that with the relatively moder-
ate immigration potential from the East-
ern Enlargement of the EU, the effects 
on unemployment will be even smaller. 
The study calculates that a 1 per cent 
increase in the share of foreigners in 
Germany for the period of 1990-1995 
makes the probability to become unem-
ployed for domestic workers increase by 
0.18 per cent, i.e., 7,500 additional un-
employed, with a remarkable bias to-
wards low-skilled workers.  
The IZA study refers to the 
EIC/DIW study and concludes that the 
impacts of immigration in Germany fol-
lowing an EU Eastern Enlargement by 10 
CEECs on the German labour market in 
general will be modest. They further 
mention that immigration of highly skilled 
workers will even result in growth ef-
fects in Germany and the impacts of 
low-skilled workers immigrating in Ger-
                                                 
58 Bauer 2000. 
59 Boeri and Brücker 2000, 84–91. 
60 Bauer 2000. 
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many will be bearable, but the exact 
structure of the potential immigrants 
concerning their skills cannot be fore-
seen.61 
Another study from the IFO 62 con-
cludes that skill-unbiased immigration 
can reduce unemployment by output ex-
pansion effects for both, highly skilled 
and low-skilled workers.63 But, since the 
authors expect immigration to be con-
centrated in the low-skilled segment, only 
highly skilled workers experience a lower 
unemployment rate, while unemployment 
among low-skilled workers increases. The 
study calculates empirical results of im-
pacts on unemployment and wage levels 
in three steps. Initially, only the effects 
of low-skilled workers among the immi-
grants are calculated. Simply by their 
immigration, the unemployment rate of 
domestic low-skilled workers increases by 
0.544 per cent, while that of highly 
skilled workers decreases by 0.088 per 
cent, resulting in an average increase of 
0.058 per cent. Wages of low-skilled 
workers decline sharply by 4.251 per 
cent, while those of highly skilled work-
ers increase by 1.174 per cent. However, 
the second part of the effects, consider-
ing the highly skilled workers among the 
immigrants, shows reduced unemploy-
ment by 0.121 per cent for low-skilled 
and 0.023 per cent for highly skilled 
workers, resulting in an average 0.043 
per cent reduction. Wages are up 0.921 
per cent for low-skilled and 0.171 per 
cent for highly skilled workers. Putting 
these partial impacts together in the 
third step, total immigration results in a 
0.009 per cent increase in average un-
employment, a 0.402 per cent increase 
for low-skilled and 0.110 per cent de-
cline for highly skilled labour. Wages 
are down 3.389 per cent for low-skilled 
and up 1.353 per cent for highly skilled 
workers.64 
                                                 
61 Bauer and Zimmermann 1999, 65–74. 
62 Heijdra et al. 2002. 
63 See also Table 4. 
64 Ibid, 25–6; Table 4. 
These results underline my conclu-
sion that the impacts of immigration are 
differently allocated among highly skilled 
and low-skilled workers. Since the pre-
cise structure of potential migration from 
Eastern Enlargement to Germany cannot 
be known in advance, the exact alloca-
tion of benefits and losses among domes-
tic workers is not clear. But it should be 
emphasized that the overall impacts on 
the German labour market are commonly 
regarded as moderate. The next section 
analyses whether the same holds true for 
the welfare system. 
3.2. Germany’s welfare system 
This section seeks to identify incentives 
for potential migrants to move to Ger-
many that result from differences in wel-
fare systems. It discusses the effects of 
this post-Enlargement migration on Ger-
many’s welfare system. 
3.2.1. Incentives to migrate 
The IFO study65 points out differences in 
the welfare systems of Germany and of 
the CEECs, using data from the ILO on 
state aid payments to certain social 
groups. Welfare expenditures turnout to 
be much higher in the former. In 1996, 
Germany spent 29.7 per cent of its GDP 
on welfare, whereas the 4a CEECs’ share 
was 16.7 per cent, with 20.9 per cent in 
Slovakia and Hungary and 12.5 per cent 
in the Czech Republic and Romania. At 
the same time, welfare expenses in Por-
tugal amounted to 11.0 per cent of GDP 
and in Turkey 5.2 per cent.66 In 1997, 
Germany’s unemployment payments for a 
single person reached 60 per cent of a 
worker’s income and its social-security 
payments 54 per cent, which is similar 
in Hungary’s (61 and 44 per cent), but 
                                                 
65 Sinn et al. 2000. 
66 Ibid., 83–4. 
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those in the Czech Republic (51 and 34 
per cent) and Poland (38 and 36 per 
cent) are much less. The payments for a 
family with two children in 1997, 
though, exceeded Germany’s (73 per 
cent unemployment payments and 52 per 
cent social-security payments) in the 
Czech Republic (83 and 81 per cent), 
while Hungary (69 and 56 per cent) 
and Poland were behind (43 and 39 per 
cent). Finally, it is interesting to compare 
the social-security payments for a family 
with two children in Germany with the 
net income of a family in the CEECs in 
absolute terms and PPP. In 1997, a fam-
ily in Germany received USD 11,700 a 
year in social-security payments, whereas 
the net income of a similar family in the 
Czech Republic amounted to USD 
10,600. In Poland (USD 7200) and Hun-
gary (USD 5900) it was much less.67 
Another study68 measures intergen-
erational redistribution by comparing 
public pension spending relative to GDP. 
While in 2000, Germany spent 11.8 per 
cent, Poland 10.8 per cent, the Czech 
Republic 7.8 per cent and Hungary 6.0 
per cent, in a projection to the year 
2050, Germany will face spending some 
16.9 per cent of GDP on public pen-
sions, the Czech Republic 14.6 per cent, 
Poland 8.3 per cent and Hungary 7.2 
per cent. The study argues on this pro-
jection that it is not favourable for a 
young worker to be a member of a 
pension system that shows a development 
like the German one, where substantial 
future reforms can be expected for 
demographic reasons. By calculating in-
ternal rates of return on the pension 
systems,69 the authors conclude that av-
erage returns on contributions to the 
pension system are higher in the CEECs 
than in Germany, making it less attrac-
tive to be a future contributor to the 
German pension system.70 However, it is 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 90–96. 
68 Krieger and Sauer 2003, 24–5. 
69 The growth rate of average wages added to 
population growth. 
70 Ibid. 
hard to say whether potential migrants 
make such calculations, or whether they 
are swayed more by obvious differences 
in welfare payments pointed out earlier. 
3.2.2. Impacts of migration on 
Germany’s welfare system 
This subsection discusses if the additional 
migrants expected in Germany after 
Eastern Enlargement will negatively affect 
Germany’s welfare system by drawing 
more than they contribute and thereby 
generating additional artificial migration 
incentives. 
The Krieger and Sauer study con-
siders solely the impacts on Germany’s 
pension system, which they are expected 
to be almost negligible, but positive. The 
potential immigrants to Germany are ex-
pected to be relatively young, so that 
they will contribute more to the German 
pension system than they benefit from it 
in the long term, if the migration poten-
tial turns out to be the estimated 
130,000–300,000 a year in the first 15 
years.71 It also projects that Germany’s 
public pension spending in relation to 
GDP will increase from 11.8 per cent in 
2000 to 16.9 per cent in 2050, calcu-
lated on a baseline of 300,000 net im-
migrants a year declining to 20,000 
over that period. A 50 per cent increase 
in the number of immigrants lowers the 
pension spending relation by only 1 per 
cent. So even massive immigration after 
Eastern Enlargement will only have slight 
effects on the German pension system.72 
However, the IFO study analyses the 
impacts on the welfare system through 
each of the social-security funds. Immi-
grants contribute on average 5 per cent 
less to the public health insurance system 
than Germans do. To the public nursing 
care insurance system, however, foreign-
ers in 1997 foreigners contributed EUR 1 
billion more than they received.73 And 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 17–18. 
72 Ibid., 25. 
73 Converted at a rate of DEM 2 = EUR 1. 
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even when taking into account that they 
built up claims on future benefits from 
the funds, the study comes to the result 
that foreigners are net contributors to 
the public nursing care insurance system, 
contributing to it to a larger extent than 
Germans do. To the public pension sys-
tem, foreigners74 are generally net con-
tributors based on current payments, 
whereas Germans are not. With public 
unemployment insurance, immigrants re-
ceive more benefits than they contribute; 
those staying fewer than 24 years in 
Germany are net contributors, but those 
staying longer than 25 years are net 
beneficiaries. The situation looks different 
with the social-security funds. Just 1.3 
per cent of all Germans receive such 
payments, while 3.1 per cent of all for-
eigners do, with a bias towards those in 
the 10–25 age group. Finally, the study 
strikes a balance for all public funds 
and concludes that foreigners, in 1997, 
were net recipients from the German 
welfare system. This so called migration 
premium amounted to EUR 700 per cap-
ita, with EUR 2300 for those who had 
lived there for less than 10 years, but a 
net contribution of EUR 85075 per capita 
for those resident for more than 25 
years. The authors argue that immigrant 
workers have low average skills, or at 
least they are in the short term em-
ployed in low-skilled jobs below their 
skill-level, so that their wage incomes 
and consequent welfare contributions are 
low compared with the social benefits 
they receive.76 
The authors of another IFO report77 
argue, from the finding that immigrants 
in Germany are net recipients of the 
welfare system, for artificial migration 
incentives, especially among low-skilled 
workers, and thereby in the short term, 
for an enlarged migration potential for 
Germany. The resulting fiscal burden, 
                                                 
74 If they do not stay longer than 25 years. 
75 Converted at a rate DEM 2 = EUR 1. 
76 Sinn et al. 2000, 190. 
77 Sinn and Werding 2001, 44–5; Sinn 2002, 
107–9. 
they argue, will encourage the destina-
tion country to reduce welfare benefits, 
so that erosive forces of competition 
among EU welfare systems may evolve. 
4) TRANSITIONAL PERIODS OF 
LIMITED LABOUR MOVEMENT 
Against the results shown in the preced-
ing section, the EU Council decided at a 
meeting in 2002 that free movement of 
labour would be limited for a two-year 
period after Enlargement, with the possi-
bility for member-states to extend this to 
seven years. Germany was expected to 
avail itself of the whole seven-year pe-
riod, when a restricted number of work 
permits for migrant workers from the 
CEECs would be issued. This section con-
siders the economic impacts of such 
curbs. 
The EIC/DIW, IFO and IZA studies 
agree that it is not useful to curb move-
ment completely. Assuming a policy of 
zero net migration from the 8 CEECs in 
the transitional period, the EIC/DIW 
study calculates that postponing free 
movement from 2004 to 2006, 2009 or 
even 2011 would neither reduce net mi-
gration flows in the initial years after 
liberalization nor affect the long-term 
stock of foreigners. In the most radical 
scenario – a seven-year period for the 
first two rounds78 – the net annual in-
crease in immigrants peaks at 210,000 
in 2015. This is 15,000 less than if free 
movement had been introduced for all 
10a CEECs at the same time in 2004. 
Restrictive use of the transitional period 
fails to mitigate potential pressures from 
migration on labour markets and welfare 
systems.79 All three studies agree on the 
need to limit free movement of labour 
                                                 
78 Zero migration from the 8 CEECs until 2011, 
then from Bulgaria and Romania until 2014. 
79 Alvarez-Plata et al. 2003, 41–2 and 46. 
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with quotas for a transitional period, as 
was done for the Southern Enlargement 
of 1986. 
The IFO study80 points out that lim-
iting free movement with work-permit 
quotas can prevent artificial immigration 
lured by prospects of net welfare bene-
fits. Quotas are beneficial, as they also 
prevent crowding-out of domestic work-
ers if wages are inflexible and above 
market level. This effect is probable, as 
Western European wages are rather 
rigid. If they were flexible, immigrant 
labour would simply depress wages, but 
leave domestic unemployment unaf-
fected.81 
Implementing a transitional period 
of limited labour movement makes poten-
tial migration to Germany more precisely 
predictable and allows labour markets 
and the welfare system to adjust gradu-
ally to the migration flows.82 
5) CONCLUSIONS AND 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As the first round of Eastern Enlarge-
ment was implemented on May 1, 2004, 
public opinion in Germany was con-
cerned mainly about migration surges, 
rising unemployment, decreasing wages, 
and more welfare claimants. It has been 
pointed out there is some potential East-
West migration to be expected in the 
coming years, with differentiated impacts 
on the German economy.  
People are expected to migrate if 
the present value of their net benefits is 
higher in the destination country than in 
the home country. Future migration po-
tential for Germany after Eastern 
Enlargement may be derived from demo-
graphic arguments, the stock of foreign-
                                                 
80 Sinn et al. 2000. 
81 Ibid., 323–36. 
82 Boeri and Brücker 2000, 130–31. 
ers in Germany, and similar historical 
events, such as the EU Southern 
Enlargement. It becomes clear that some 
immigrants are actually needed for 
demographic reasons, to keep the wel-
fare system functioning in the future. 
This need is calculated at some 450,000 
immigrants a year, to prevent long-term 
decline in the population of Germany’s 
ageing society. Results of calculated 
overall migration potentials vary very 
widely from 800,000 to 3,300,000 up to 
the year 2030, with an annual 200,000–
250,000 in the early years, depending 
on the assumptions made. 
There are expected impacts of this 
migration potential on the German la-
bour market, since there is a huge po-
tential for convergence based on differ-
ences in the labour markets of the 
CEECs and Germany. These impacts con-
cern levels of qualification, wage levels 
and unemployment rates. Pressure on 
wage levels is expected to evolve in in-
dustries where domestic workers are 
substitutive, rather than complementary 
to immigrant workers. Such crowding-
out effects are foreseen for low-skilled 
workers in Germany’s manufacturing 
and construction industries. Studies gen-
erally conclude that incomes of low-
skilled workers decrease and incomes of 
highly skilled workers slightly increase if 
immigrants are mainly low-skilled work-
ers, while incomes of highly skilled 
workers slightly decrease and incomes of 
low-skilled workers increase if immi-
grants are mainly highly skilled workers. 
No remarkable impact of immigration on 
unemployment in the destination country 
was found, except a slight bias towards 
increasing unemployment among low-
skilled workers. The EIC/DIW study, 
based on an immigration potential of 
200,000 a year over a period of 10–15 
years calculates decreasing wages (0.81 
per cent) and increasing unemployment 
(0.54 per cent). Low-skilled workers, es-
pecially in regions directly bordering the 
CEECs, will face sharper income cuts 
than highly skilled workers. Still, the 
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consensus opinion in the studies is that 
the impacts on the German labour mar-
ket in general will be modest. 
A remarkable share of the migra-
tion potential is connected to wrong in-
centives resulting from higher social-
security benefits in Germany than in the 
CEECs. Although the results calculated in 
studies vary widely, it can be generally 
assumed that immigrants in Germany are 
net beneficiaries of the welfare system, 
which results in additional, artificial mi-
gration incentives, especially among low-
skilled workers, and thereby to an in-
creased migration potential for Germany 
in the short term. The resulting fiscal 
burden might encourage the destination 
country to reduce benefits from its wel-
fare system, releasing erosive forces of 
competition among EU welfare systems. 
Against this background, the EU 
Council decided in 2002 that the free 
movement of labour would be limited 
for a two-year period that could be ex-
tended to seven years. A restrictive use 
of this transition period fails to mitigate 
possible pressures from migration on the 
labour market and the welfare system, 
but limiting free movement through 
work-permit quotas may prevent artificial 
migration drawn by the net benefits 
from the welfare system applicable tradi-
tionally to immigrants. The transition 
might make the migration potential for 
Germany more predictable and enable 
labour markets and the welfare system 
to adjust gradually to the migration 
flows. 
But there are other reasons why 
benefits from migration may not be per-
fectly generated. The German labour 
market, like most in Western Europe, 
suffers an overload of restrictions and 
inflexibility, i.e., inflexible and restricted 
working conditions, rigid wages, and 
powerful unions. These restrictions will 
probably act as barriers to evolution of 
the positive welfare effects on the Ger-
man labour market to be expected from 
immigration of highly skilled labour, as 
rigid wages may prevent positive em-
ployment effects. But the German gov-
ernment has probably managed to miti-
gate the negative effects of migration on 
the labour market and welfare system in 
the early years by pressing for transition 
periods of limited movement of labour. 
But the transition periods will probably 
postpone at most the migration potentials 
and impacts on labour markets and the 
welfare system, so that this negotiated 
success should not be abused as a le-
gitimate excuse for Germany’s political 
elites to rest on their laurels and omit 
necessary structural reforms. 
When analysing the potential im-
pacts of Eastern Enlargement on the 
German economy today, and perhaps 
later in a follow-up review, it is indis-
pensable to establish a strict causality. It 
is necessary to differentiate clearly be-
tween direct effects of Enlargement and 
what are inevitable consequences of re-
strictions and inflexibility in the German 
labour market or detrimental incentives 
in the welfare system. It should be top 
priority for Germany’s political elites to 
dismantle such incentives and inflexibility, 
but there is also a need for evaluations 
by objective economists, so that mislead-
ing calculations of net results cannot 
turn this first Eastern Enlargement into a 
scapegoat for inadequate and insufficient 
political reforms. It should rather open 
up the prospects of further rounds of 
Eastern Enlargements to Turkey, Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus. 
 
* * * * * 
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Table 1 
DIW calculations of migration potential for Germany from the 10a CEECs, persons 
 
 2002 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
 
 
 
Baseline projection for EU 15 
Stock of immigrants 1,159,804 1,987,718 2,907,367 3,437,146 3,721,613 3,853,542 3,892,345 
as a percentage of EU 15 0.31 0.53 0.78 0.93 1.01 1.06 1.08 
 
 
 
Baseline projection for German 
 
Increase in the number of immigrants 218,429 161,722 95,560, 53,720 27,509 11,320 1,539 
Stock of immigrants 754,328 1,292,798 1,890,932, 2,235,498 2,420,512 2,506,321 2,531,556 
 
 
 
Low projection for Germany 
 
Increase in the number of immigrants 175,189 126,204 68,758, 33,444 12,187 -201 -7,039 
Stock of immigrants  711,088 1,136,369 1,585,359, 1,815,231 1,914,263 1,935,258 1,912,013 
 
 
 
High projection for German 
 
Increase in the number of immigrants 241,443 183,537 114,117, 69,565 41,062 22,912 11,437 
Stock of immigrants 777,342 1,383,485 2,080,670, 2,509,670 2,766,918 2,914,491 2,992,507 
Source: Boeri and Brücker 2000; European Integration Consortium; Berlin and Milano. 
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Table 2 
IFO calculations of migration potential for Germany from the 5a CEECs, persons 
 
 
Years after accession 
 
  
  
0 1 2 3 5 10 15 
   
Relative income growth of 2% in the CEECs 
 
Net migration 0 193,000 240,000 248,000 225,000 133,000 60,000 
Stock of immigrants 459,000 656,000 902,000 1,168,000 1,681,000 2,660,000 3,225,000 
   
Relative income growth of 0% in the CEECs 
 
Net migration 
0 199,000 254,000 273,000, 264,000 205,000 153,000 
Stock of immigrants 
459,000 662,000 921,000 1,209,000 1,790,000 3,064,000 4,055,000 
Source: Sinn et al. 2000 
 
Table 3 
Labour markets in the CEECs and Germany – a comparison, as of 1995 
 
Population in 
working age 
Labour 
force Employees
Employment to 
population 
in working age 
Gross annual wages
and salaries  
In thousand persons Rate in Per employee in USD 
10a CEECs average 72,182 48,207 37,788 52 3,101 
Germany 55,714 38,483 31,248 56 40,999 
EU 15 249,027 165,495 122,931 49 34,885 
1Oa CEECs in % of EU 15 29 29 31 n.a. 9 
Source: Boeri and Brücker 2000; European Integration Consortium; Berlin and Milano 
 
 
Table 4 
Long-term macroeconomic effects on Germany, changes in % 
 
  
Impacts of 
total migration
Impacts just of 
low-skilled     
migrants 
Impacts just of 
the skilled    
migrants 
Unemployment rate of domestic low-skilled labour 
(on a basis of 10.000%) 10.402 10.544 9.879 
    
Unemployment rate of domestic highly skilled 
(on a basis of 6.000%) 5.890 5.912 5.977 
       
Average unemployment rate 
(on a basis of 6.668%) 6.677 6.726 6.625 
Wage level of low-skilled labour -3.389 -4.251 0.921 
Wage level of high-skilled labour 1.353 1.174 0.171 
Source: Heijdra, B. et al. 2002; CESifo Working Paper No. 718 (7); May 
 
 
